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Mine Action - The Management of Risk
By Mr. Steve Brown
Issue 3.1 | February 1999
Information in this issue may be out of date. Click here to link to the most
recent issue.
Introduction
The examination of "Standards and Measures of Success" at the
recent Humanitarian Demining Conference, hosted by James Madison
University (JMU) demonstrated that there must be fundamental changes in
the approach to Mine Action if the global influence of land mines is to be
successfully challenged. In addressing the need to measure the
effectiveness of Mine Action we are acknowledging that the current
situation is untenable, particularly if we are to get anywhere near the
eradication of the problem by 2010.
While most agree that deadline is unattainable it does help focus our efforts
on improving the rate and cost effectiveness of Mine Action, particularly
the mine clearance element. However even if the levels of increased
funding currently promised are achieved and with even the most promising
detection technology a long way off, as the Second International
Conference on the Detection of Abandoned Land Mines showed, our
resources are totally inadequate in comparison with the scale of the
problem, if clearance methods and rates remain unchanged.
This paper will advance the view that the key to achieving the
breakthrough lies in a risk management process with a more realistic, some
might say, pragmatic, approach to mine clearance using existing resources
and technology. In doing so we must challenge our existing preconceptions
about what is both possible and desirable and call into question some of the
myths which are currently viewed as fact by the decision makers at all
levels of Mine Action.
Myth or Fact?
The JMU Conference consensus was that many of the existing International
Standards for Mine Clearance are poorly conceived, unrealistic,
unattainable, and not measurable; more often than not, observed only in the
breach. The proposed UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) review will,
hopefully, arrive at more realistic and enforceable standards and, as
importantly, look at ways of more uniformly implementing them. Areas of
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particular concern are clearance depths, personal protection equipment, the
use of mechanical equipment and the "dreaded" 99.6% clearance standard.
The assessment of clearance standards is one of the greatest myths
associated with mine clearance. The term >mine clearance = itself
engenders a belief that the process does, and must, result in areas being
totally cleared of mines. The reality is of course, that, although we strive
for 100% clearance, we rarely achieve that level because of the
combination of a number of factors that impinge on and degrade the
process but are beyond the scope of this paper.
In some ways the professional mine clearance community has abrogated its
responsibilities in this area. By allowing the 99.6% figure, which was not
based on any proper analysis of what is currently achievable or being
achieved, to be set in stone, we have allowed donors and end users to
continue to believe that the standard is always being achieved and that
anything less is unacceptable.
It is also conventional wisdom that such high clearance standards can only
be achieved by conventional manual clearance and that other detection and
clearance methods, particularly mechanical clearance, can not achieve the
required standards. Figures for mechanical clearance quote clearance levels
of only at 75-90% (depending on who has provided the analysis, where,
against what system and what agenda they were working to). Just as the
99.6% figure was "plucked from the air" so are these figures, based as they
often are on results achieved by inappropriate equipment, used in
inappropriate ways and in inappropriate conditions.
Even if we accept these disparities on face value the use of mechanical
methods has the potential to so increase our clearance rates that we must
reconsider their utility overcoming any shortcomings through better
management, better selection of equipment against the requirement, the use
of multiple passes or multiple equipment and the better management of the
residual risk of this and, indeed, any clearance programme.
The mine clearance process does not eliminate the mine threat. It is a risk
management tool that reduces the risk from mines to acceptable levels.
What are those acceptable levels, how are they measured and how do we
manage that risk?
What is Risk Management?
Risk management is the process of identifying, assessing and addressing
risks allowing operational decisions to be made that balance risk costs
against benefits. Risk compares the probability of an event occurring and
the severity of the outcome if it happens. Risk management will aim to
reduce one or both of these factors to levels at which their effect can be
discounted, accepted or mitigated through other precautions.
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This process can be summarised by a risk assessment matrix such as that
shown in figure 1.
Figure 1
Mine Action aims to reduce the impact of mines on the social and
economic well-being of the affected country. If we reduce the level of risk,
by reducing but not, necessarily, eliminating all mines, so that it falls within
the last two columns of the above matrix, we now have a manageable
residual risk. This can really only achieved by reducing the numbers of
mines present or by preventing the exposure of individuals to mined areas
by controls or education. The severity of a mine incident is largely
governed by the design of the mine, we can only mitigate its effects by
providing enhanced medical support and other victim support measures.
For mine clearance operators, however, good procedures, protective
equipment and the use of mechanical clearance or stand-off detection can
influence both dimensions.
Each function of Mine Action and each process within those functions
should include risk assessment and its own risk management process. Risk
management is continuous, subject to review and alteration as the situation
changes, more information becomes available and lessons are learnt. This
concept is summarised in the table at Figure 2.
Figure 2
In terms of mine action the risk management process can be considered in
six phases.
Phase 1 Identify the quantity, nature and extent of the mine hazard.
Phase 2 Assess the impact of the mine hazard in order to take timely,
efficient and effective measures against it.
Phase 3 Develop a mine action programme which, in line with the
national recovery plan, puts in place appropriate plans and decisions
to address the risk and balance it against humanitarian, political,
economic and environmental costs.
Phase 4 Implement the mine action plan.
Phase 5 Evaluate all elements of the mine action plan including
measures of effectiveness and lessons learnt.
Phase 6 Assess and manage the residual risk against acceptable
criteria.
The Residual Risk
In Humanitarian Mine Action what is the acceptable residual risk? The
current mind set, particularly among donors, end users and non-mine
clearance NGOs, is that the level is zero. Morally and emotionally this is
understandable but is unsustainable in practical terms.
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Even if we achieve 99.6%, and many programmes do not, there is already
residual risk. But do we have the safeguards to manage that risk? We
generally do not, because we allow end users to persist in the
misconception that the problem has been eliminated and we are afraid to
acknowledge that it has not. The mitigating measures to further reduce the
risk, such as post-clearance mine awareness, are currently rarely provided.
In Western Europe the residual risk from both mines and unexploded
ordnance originating from World Wars I and II persists today. The reality is
that mine affected countries will always remain mine affected and must
learn to live with that legacy. In the above table it should be noted that the
author believes there should be, three phases of Mines Awareness training
before, during and, most particularly after mine clearance in order to
address the residual risk from the process.
Eventually a cost and risk analysis must be made that results in practical
levels of mine action, completed in as short a time as possible and that
results in manageable, but not zero, residual risk. In order to illustrate this
concept look at the cost and risk analysis model below.
Cost and Risk Analysis Model
This is a fictitious case, but which is based on sustainable representative
figures. It compares the performance of a totally manual programme
against a mainly mechanical programme. It does not enumerate mitigating
factors such as mine awareness training and, for ease, assumes linear
progression of statistics. Within these shortcomings it illustrates effectively
the major impact that mechanical clearance can make. This is summarised
in the table below. It considers a mine-affected area of some 1,200 square
kilometres in which one casualty is being taken for every 10 square
kilometres each year. A typical manual clearance programme could clear
100 square kilometres each year at a cost of US $5 million a year.
Casualties from within the programme are taken as one a year and the
national clearance standard is 99.6%. Over eight years following the
completion of the task a further five casualties can be expected from the
0.4% of mines that remain, representing the residual risk.
Taking the same base figures for a mechanical clearance programme it
assumes that mechanical systems can clear at three times the manual rate
and at half the unit cost. These are conservative when taken against claims
from some mechanical projects of 6-10 times the manual rate at a quarter of
the unit cost. A lower figure has been taken to allow for a multiple pass or
multiple machine operation supported by conventional quality control
using dogs and/or manual teams to give a clearance standard of a nominal
95%.
Over a twenty year period from the start of the programme the manual
clearance will take 12 years to complete at a cost of US $60 Million.
Casualties from mine affected areas, among mine clearers and those from
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the residual risk would be almost 800. In contrast the mechanical
programme would be completed in four years at half the cost and with half
the number of casualties over the same twenty year period, even accepting
the higher level of residual risk.
Figure 3
This simplified cost and risk analysis does not include consideration of the
accelerated socio-economic benefits obtained by completing the
programme so much earlier. It does, however, highlight the fact that the
residual risk between 99.6% and 95% is manageable and identifiable. Risk
management would allow procedures to be used that would mitigate and
hence reduce these casualty figures.
Conclusion
If Mine Action is to accelerate to the necessary levels to meet, or at least
approach, the 2010 deadline then fundamental changes to the perceptions
and approach of donors, end users and the mine action community are
necessary. We are promised increased funding but unless our philosophy
and techniques change this will be insufficient. Technology improvements
are incremental and slow in coming.
The key is proper Risk Analysis and Management to make informed
decisions on what can be achieved with existing techniques. We have to
accept that risks cannot be eliminated, however much we think they can,
but manageable residual risk can be achieved by the increased use of
mechanical equipment. This will allow more cost effective and timely
achievement of the global mine action plan.
 
5
Brown: Mine Action - The Management of Risk
Published by JMU Scholarly Commons, 1999
